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UNDERLYING ADMIRALTY SUBJECT MATTER J URISDICTION 
REQUIRED 
Consent to jurisdiction is not sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction 
Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear 
254 F.3d 802 (91h Cir. 1998) 
(Decided June 1 3, 2001) 
Howard Littell ("Littell"), on behalf of a family trust, attempted to purchase 
the vessel Teddy Bear, a 62-foot powerboat from its owner, broker Marlineer 
International ,  Inc. ("Marlineer"). Following six months of failed negotiations 
originally between Littell and Marlineer's president, Ted Tate ("Tate") the sale was 
ultimately aborted. Littell  filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California, alleging: (I ) in rem for foreclosure of a maritime lien against 
the Teddy Bear, based on work Little performed and supervised while living on the 
yacht; (2) in rem against the Teddy Bear and in personam against the other defendants 
for foreclosure of a maritime lien, based on the monies Littell had transferred to 
Marlineer; (3) in rem against the Teddy Bear and in personam against the other 
defendants for foreclosure of a maritime lien, based on Tate and Marlineer's a l leged 
misrepresentation of the value of the yacht; and ( 4) conversion, against all defendants, 
based on the California Civil Code § 3336. 
After a bench trial, the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California determined it lacked admiralty jurisdiction. This determination was based 
on the honored principle that a suit arising out of the sale of a vessel does not give rise 
to admiralty jurisdiction. See, e.g. Magallanes Invest. Co . . Inc. v. Circuit Sys . . Inc. , 
994 F.2d 1214, 1217 ( ih Cir. 1993); J.A . R. ,  Inc. v. MIV Lady Lucile, 963 F.2d 96, 98 
( 51h Cir. 1992); Richard Bertram v. The Yacht, Wanda, 447 F.2d 966, 967 ( 51h Cir. 
1971 ); The Ada, 250 F. 194 (2d Cir. I 9 I 8); see also I BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 
§ 1 86 (Matthew Bender ih ed. 2000); 29 MOORE' S  FEDERAL PRACTICE § 
703.04 [2][c][viii] (Matthew Bender 3rd ed. 2000). However, after determining that 
there was no admiralty jurisdiction, the court proceeded to adjudicate the federal 
admiralty claims and the supplemental state-law claim in favor of the Marlineer based 
on the merits of the case. Littell appealed. 
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If a federal claim is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the 
district court has no discretion to retain the supplemental claims for adjudication. See 
16 MOORE' S  FEDERAL PRACTICE § 106.66[1]; see also Acri v. Varian Assoc. , 
114 F.3d 999, 1000 (91h Cir. 1997)("a district court must be sure that it has federal 
jurisdiction under § 1367(a) ."). For a district court to exercise discretionary 
supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c), in adjudicating the remaining claims after 
all the federal claims have been dismissed on the merits, there must first be subject 
matter jurisdiction, without which there is no discretion and the claims must be 
dismissed by the court. See Rule 12 (b)( l )(dismissal for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction). Absent subject matter jurisdiction, there is no supplemental jurisdiction 
under Rule 12(b)( l ) since there never was a valid federal claim. Devoid of the 
"substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction", the effecting of 
jurisdiction based on a nonexistent federal claim is a violation of Article I I I  of the 
Constitution. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated and 
remanded with instructions to dismiss. 
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